Post by account_disabled on Feb 28, 2024 4:33:24 GMT -6
In the great power confrontation between the US and China, military tension is rising, but the weapons of choice are economic ones. Digital technologies, trade interdependence, and cyberwarfare blur the boundaries of economic and security policy in ways that affect us all. The race for leadership in green technology and AI development is also about geopolitical dominance. Government intervention in markets is increasing through sanctions, trade protection, export controls, supply chain management and investment screening, such as the US Science and Chip Act, its new controls on investment in China and the draft EU economic security strategy. These interventions place companies, investors and scientists on the front lines of contradictory international politics, seeking reassurance. Given the rapidly moving threats, there will never be complete certainty. But they can reasonably expect governments to establish coherent policies that balance open economic relations with national security restrictions.
They are entitled to opportunities for consultation. Since the G7 summit in Hiroshima in May, the idea of reducing economic dependence on high-risk countries is replacing wilder notions of complete decoupling, which Job Function Email Database would have catastrophic economic and political consequences. Continued economic interdependence preserves prosperity and deters conflict. But companies need to know what this approach means in practice. When US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan talks about keeping sensitive technologies within a “small yard and a tall fence,” they ask what should be kept in the yard and how the fence is constructed. The UK should focus on improving the way decisions are made and implemented. For example, advice to the interdepartmental National Security Council, which negotiates sensitive decisions at the heart of Whitehall, has been dominated by "securocrats", many of whom have limited knowledge of economics and business. There should be a stronger economic counterweight.
The Treasury is rightly boosting its own expertise in economic security. Transparent and effective dialogue with the private sector is vital. Occasional feel-good meetings between hand-picked CEOs and senior ministers are not enough. The consultation must be early, systematic and operational; Often, what is most important to the business is the nitty-gritty of implementation, such as the precise specification of products captured by a checklist. Whitehall's poor record in making timely decisions when applying export controls on sensitive technologies is rightly criticised. Companies are caught between different departments with little idea of where the final decision lies or when it will emerge. The processes for constructive challenge are unclear. There is a strong case for a single “showcase” for commercial linking. Similarly, while the National Security and Investment Act sets out objective criteria relating to sensitive sectors and size of holding, the recent shift of responsibility from the Department of Business and Trade to the Cabinet Office is a tacit recognition that the most difficult cases are politically sensitive.
They are entitled to opportunities for consultation. Since the G7 summit in Hiroshima in May, the idea of reducing economic dependence on high-risk countries is replacing wilder notions of complete decoupling, which Job Function Email Database would have catastrophic economic and political consequences. Continued economic interdependence preserves prosperity and deters conflict. But companies need to know what this approach means in practice. When US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan talks about keeping sensitive technologies within a “small yard and a tall fence,” they ask what should be kept in the yard and how the fence is constructed. The UK should focus on improving the way decisions are made and implemented. For example, advice to the interdepartmental National Security Council, which negotiates sensitive decisions at the heart of Whitehall, has been dominated by "securocrats", many of whom have limited knowledge of economics and business. There should be a stronger economic counterweight.
The Treasury is rightly boosting its own expertise in economic security. Transparent and effective dialogue with the private sector is vital. Occasional feel-good meetings between hand-picked CEOs and senior ministers are not enough. The consultation must be early, systematic and operational; Often, what is most important to the business is the nitty-gritty of implementation, such as the precise specification of products captured by a checklist. Whitehall's poor record in making timely decisions when applying export controls on sensitive technologies is rightly criticised. Companies are caught between different departments with little idea of where the final decision lies or when it will emerge. The processes for constructive challenge are unclear. There is a strong case for a single “showcase” for commercial linking. Similarly, while the National Security and Investment Act sets out objective criteria relating to sensitive sectors and size of holding, the recent shift of responsibility from the Department of Business and Trade to the Cabinet Office is a tacit recognition that the most difficult cases are politically sensitive.